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Fuente: MPRA Paper
I analyze the effect of an unexpected influx of immigrants on the price of skill and hence on the earnings, human capital accumulation, and educational attainment of native workers. In order to study
these effects, I develop a general equilibrium model with heterogeneous workers who differ in their level of skill and in their ability to learn new skills. These workers accumulate human capital optimally using information about the current and future market price of skill to guide their decisions. To assess the impact of immigration, I compare simulated earnings in the presence of immigration with a series of counterfactual experiments. My findings suggest that immigration has a small negative direct effect on earnings, but a positive and relatively large impact indirectly through human capital accumulation and educational attainment. This latter mechanism explains 60% of the variations in earnings caused by immigration.
Fuente: IDB Working Paper Series Nº IDB-WP-772
Using data from the World Bank’s Enterprise Survey, this paper explores the determinants of firms’ training decisions in Latin America and the Caribbean. The share of production for the export market and the size of the firm are key factors; training programs are not prevalent in all sectors. In addition, the share of workers receiving training depends on the age of the firm, and only for non-productive workers are differences observed across sectors. More detailed data from a Longitudinal Enterprise Survey in Chile are used to corroborate these findings. It is found that the percentage of workers receiving training is low and that the extensive and intensive margins of training are affected by different sets of firm characteristics. Finally, the results of a qualitative study in Chile suggest that training is mostly introduced to comply with certifications and standards imposed by domestic and foreign authorities. Training in larger firms may also be oriented to improve the work environment.
This paper studies how private information affects the pairwise stability of networks in the co-author model. I assume that the nodes have incomplete information with respect to unlinked nodes and complete information with respect to linked nodes. A node’s incentive to form a link is increasing in its type if, and only if, the increase of the magnitude of the negative externality induced by a new link is small relative to the benefit of a new interaction. This occurs because a node’s type only affects its incentive to form a link through the interaction and not through the direct effect of a new link. Also, a node’s incentive to form a new link is decreasing in each of the neighbors’ types. This occurs because the negative externality of a new link is increasing in the neighbors types. Adding information can increase or reduce a node’s incentives to form new links. Therefore, adding information can maintain or undermine the stability of a network. I use these results to provide necessary and sufficient conditions on the type profile so that a star network is pairwise stable under private information and not under complete information.
This paper investigates how an initial asymmetry in production costs aects costreducing R&D investment decisions, welfare, and the welfare dierences between noncooperative R&D investment and a research joint venture. Using a duopoly model in which R&D investment generates spillovers and builds absorptive capacity, we nd that under both R&D investment regimes, increasing the initial cost asymmetry reduces welfare due to a reduction in aggregate R&D investment, higher production costs, and lower aggregate production. We also nd that if there exists a spillover value for which welfare under the two regimes is the same, then increasing the initial cost asymmetry has an ambiguous eect